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As the world struggles to address climate change, renewable energy is becoming an
increasingly important electricity source. However, non-renewable sources of energy
are still relevant. While moving forward with investments in wind and solar power
projects, it is important to consider the relationship between renewable energy and
non-renewable energy sources such as natural gas. Natural gas is a direct competitor
to renewable energy in both the contract and spot bulk power markets. At the same
time, the operational flexibility of gas-fired generation makes it a promising resource
to offset natural fluctuations in sunlight and wind.
Natural gas and intermittent renewables are mostly seen as substitutes, both
in the economic literature and the policy arena. Indeed, considering their intrinsic
technical substitutability within power generation, it is quite natural to assume that
an increase in the price of natural gas will increase incentives to invest in renewable
energy generation. However, the intermittency and the comparative advantage in
terms of the input price of renewable energy undoubtably provide some scope for
complementarities. This is particularly true for natural gas, due to its high degree
of flexibility in electricity production. Natural gas generators can almost instanta-
neously supply the market when renewables do not produce.
Other have analyzed the complex relationship between natural gas and intermit-
tent renewable energy. However, the economic literature on the interplay between
natural gas and renewable energy is relatively new. The theoretical literature has
largely focused on the technological assumption that fossil fuels and renewables can
substitute one for another. Most theoretical analysis explain how choices (in terms
of capacity or inputs) between conventional and intermittent generation technologies
are made. Some studies provide a social point of view, such as the partial equili-
brium analysis in Ambec and Crampes (2012) or the general equilibrium framework
in Schwerin (2013). Other studies look for strategic market-based explanations,
such as Bouckaert and De Borger (2014) and Aflaki and Netessine (2017). All these
studies consider thermal-based primary energy sources and intermittent ones to be
substitutes, in that a rise in fuel prices eventually leads to increased investment in
renewable energy.
However, some nuances to the substitutability between renewables and fossil fu-
els have been identified in the literature. For example, Bouckaert and De Borger
(2014) show that from a strategic point of view, capacity choices between conventi-
onal dispatchable and intermittent generation technologies (in a duopolistic setting)
3may be strategic complements when intermittent generation conditions are unfavo-
rable. But they remain net substitutes at the equilibrium, considering capacity cost
effects. Using an electricity peak-load pricing model, Chao (2011) concludes that
“the wind generation capacity generally substitutes the investment in combined cy-
cle GT capacity but complements the investment in gas turbine units.” In the same
vein, Garcia et al. (2012) analyze optimal versus equilibrium mix of renewable and
non-renewable technologies and state that “renewable capacity should be seen as a
substitute to baseload technologies and complementary to peak generation techno-
logies.” Recently Ambec and Crampes (2015) have studied the optimal energy mix
when renewables are used and find that capacities installed for the purpose of balan-
cing intermittent sources can be lowered when environmental damages (or carbon
taxes) go over a certain level. This can be interpreted as a complementary relati-
onship between intermittent sources and fossil fuels when the impacts of different
public policies that aim to decarbonate electricity production are considered.
These conclusions have also been acknowledged in the policy literature. For
instance, Lee et al. (2012) argues that a complementary relationship between natural
gas and renewable energy sources can be established. Technical, environmental,
political and economic considerations explain this claim. From an economic point of
view, the energy sources have different risk profiles, so they may be complementary
portfolio options. Lee et al. argue that natural gas price volatility would be balanced
by stable (near zero) generating costs of renewable energy investments and, on the
flip-side, natural gas plants’ low up-front costs counterbalance inherent risks due to
the intermittency of renewable generation plants.
This complementary relationship is also studied in the empirical literature on
the determinants of investment in and production of renewable energies (see Delmas
and Montes-Santo (2011), Fabrizio (2013), Hitaj (2013) and Polzin et al. (2015) ,
among others).1 These papers mainly focus on the impact of various policy tools
(such as feed-in tariffs or renewable portfolio standards) using aggregate data. In
some of these studies, the price of natural gas or other fossil fuels is used as a control
variable. Using European data, Marques et al. (2010) find a positive relationship
between the share of contribution of renewables to the energy supply and the natural
gas price, i.e. substitutability. Using U.S. data, Shrimali and Kniefel (2011) find a
significant negative relationship between the share of renewable (wind, solar, biomass
and geothermal) capacity and the total net generation, i.e. complementarity. Using
their own words, “The flexible natural gas based plants are used for overcoming the
1There is also a substantial literature that estimates the energy cross-price elasticities based on
applied production theory. See Stern (2010) for a survey.
4intermittency issues inherent in renewable power generation — in particular wind,
the dominant renewable source.” Shrimali and Kniefel (2011, p.4737).
The aim of our analysis is to consider, both from an empirical and theoretical
point of view, the extent of gross substitutabilities or complementarities between in-
termittent renewables sources and natural gas. For this purpose, we rather study the
indirect price effect of a flexible input onto an investment decision than the technolo-
gical relationship between inputs or the strategic link between supply decisions. We
follow this approach because renewable energies are must-run technologies. Hence,
the strategic decision happens at the investment rather than at the production stage.
In a first step, using U.S. state-level data from 1998 to 2015, collected from
the U.S. Energy Information Administration, we look at the empirical link between
the renewable energy and the natural gas market. We use a panel Tobit model to
study the determinants of capacity investments in intermittent renewable energy.
We focus mainly on renewable energy investment’s relationship with the price of
natural gas, using various socioeconomic, electricity market, policy and tax factors
as control variables. Hence, we follow a macro approach in the sense that we use
aggregate yearly data at the state level. In contrast with the literature, we allow
for a non-monotonic relationship between our two main variables of concern. As
confirmed by various empirical specifications, we find that this relationship is best
represented by an inverted U-shape.
In a second step we develop a model that reproduces and explains what is at
stake behind this empirical fact. Using a simple theoretical framework, we find that
for relatively low prices of natural gas, they are substitutes, as the absence of an
input cost for renewable production is less valued. On the other hand, for relatively
high natural gas prices, they are complementary, as the flexibility of a fossil fuel
energy source can circumvent the intermittency of renewable energy sources (as
they cannot be stocked and are not perfectly predictable).
Our analysis has some implications for policymakers. It suggests a need for more
comprehensive policies in the energy sector. Our paper highlights how various policy
changes could have a wide impact, as the markets composing the energy sector are
intertwined in a more complex manner than originally thought. For example, the
Trump administration has recently decided to ease drilling rights and investments
in new pipeline projects to boost the U.S. production capacities (Goldberg (2017)).
Other examples like increasing political tensions between Russia, the world’s biggest
exporter of natural gas, and European countries or the signing of bilateral free trade
agreements between importing and exporting nations will not only have an influence
5on the natural gas market. These changes will also have an impact on investments
in renewable energies, depending on the prevailing market conditions and, more
specifically, the price of natural gas. Hence, caution is needed when anticipating the
consequences of these changes.
2 Empirical evidence
We first study the empirical link between non-renewable and renewable electricity
markets. More precisely, we focus on the relationship between investments in re-
newable energy sources and the input price of a non-renewable technology, in our
case, natural gas. Figure 1 shows the relationship between the natural gas price and
renewable capacity investments for 49 U.S. states between 1998-2015, as well as a
quadratic fit (only considering strictly positive investments). The graphic suggests
that a non-linear relationship is more plausible than a linear one. In what follows,
we show that this suggestive evidence is robust to various empirical approaches.
Figure 1
Scatterplot of renewable capacity investments (inverse hyperbolic sine transformation)
and average natural gas price for all U.S. states between 1998 and 2015 and a quadratic
fit (with confidence intervals of 95%)
62.1 Data
2.1.1 Dependent variables
Our analysis focuses on capacity investments, as opposed to accumulated invest-
ments, market share or generation to better highlight the outcome of our invest-
ment decision, net of previous years and independently from unpredictable weather
conditions. Finally, in line with our theoretical model, we focus on investments in
two sources: solar and wind. They are both non-flexible intermittent and renewable
sources of production that don’t create negative externalities through their capacity
installments, the production of electricity or the supply of inputs. We use state-level
data rather than data at the level of power pools. The main reason is that power
pools are a rather new phenomena and are not present in many states. Hence, state-
level data allows us to consider a bigger and more representative set of observations.
More control variables are also available at the state level which is a coherent entity
with respect to the energy policies implemented.
Our data comes from U.S. Energy Information Administration (2017) where
state-level data on both renewable capacity investments and natural gas prices is
available (via the EIA-860 form). To consider both the increasing number of units
producing electricity and the increase in productivity observed over time, we multi-
ply the number of generators installed by their nameplate capacity (i.e. maximum
output of a generator expressed in megawatts). As our dependent variable is heavily
right-skewed and has a non-normal kurtosis, we apply the inverted hyperbolic sine
transformation to deal with this problem, as in Rodriguez et al. (2015).2
2.1.2 Independent variables
Our explanatory variable is the price of natural gas, which is the unit price of
the main input in the production of non-renewable electricity. Other independent
variables act as controls under three categories: socioeconomic, electricity market
and policy/tax factors. This is a stark contrast with Marques et al. (2010), Shrimali
and Kniefel (2011) and others who use an aggregate approach like us, but focused
mainly on the impact of tax and policy tools using, among other things, prices as
control variables. We will also consider a more general specification than them by
allowing non-linearities.
2Our results hold if, as done in our robustness analysis and advised in Cameron and Trivedi
(2010), we add a small constant before taking the log of our dependent variable.
71. Price of natural gas
As we need to restrict the analysis to publicly available data, we do not have
access to the estimated future prices of natural gas as used in the business
plans assessing these renewable energy projects. Instead we use data from
EIA (2016). Natural gas price is the average price paid (in nominal dollars
per million Btu) by the electric power sector for natural gas for each state
and year combination. It includes the cost of natural gas as well as insurance,
freight and taxes. We consider both a linear and a quadratic term. As there
might be time lags between the time the investment is decided and the pro-
duction facility is operational, we include up to four-year lags. The economic
explanation comes from the red tapes, construction timing and delays related
to the investments. Due to multicollinearity between these price variables,
we focus on the specification assuming a one-year lag.3 Hence, by conside-
ring prices lagged by one year, we assume that investors use, at the time of
the investment decision, the current natural gas price as an estimation of its
expected future price.4
2. Electricity market factors
The first three factors (state size, wind potential and sun potential) all measure
the feasibility of installing wind and solar farms. These are variables that
are held constant across years. One would expect larger states to host more
investments. Wind potential is the wind generation potential for each state
at an 80 meter height, with capacity factors of at least 30% measured in
TWh/year, as provided by National Renewable Energy Laboratory (2011).
Sun potential is the solar radiation for flat-plate collectors facing south at a
fixed tilt (kWh/m2/day), as measured in the largest city of each state (National
Renewable Energy Laboratory (2010)).
Growth in electricity sales is the growth in the amount of electricity sold for
each state compared with the previous year. It is a measure of the incremental
demand for electricity. Electricity price is the average price of electricity sold
by state producers of electricity. Since the price of electricity is a good proxy
for the per-unit returns derived from installed capacities, the coefficient of this
variable is expected to be positive.
3Our results hold further using no lag or two lags but standard errors are sometimes impacted,
leading to lower significance levels.
4Note that, as our results hold in the case where we use contemporaneous data, this means that
the investor’s price expectations are fulfilled, at least at the time it is possible to reap the fruits of
the investment decided in t− 1.
8Production % renew. energy, production % nuclear energy and production %
natural gas represent, respectively, the market share of electricity produced
using intermittent and renewable sources, nuclear sources and natural gas.
Data for these variables comes from the U.S. Energy Information Adminis-
tration (2017) database. Due to agglomeration effects in the production of
renewable energies, the sign of Production % renew. energy is expected to be
positive. However, this could be counteracted by an increasing difficulty in
integrating this intermittent energy source in the policy mix. Nuclear energy’s
share of production is expected to be negative, as it is complicated to easily
switch from one source of production to renewable energy. Conversely, pro-
duction % natural gas is expected to have a positive sign as it technically
complements renewable energy sources providing services in smoothing the in-
termittency of renewable energy availability. However this does not necessarily
suggest greater overall natural gas generation. This allow us to control for the
increasing importance of the natural gas, due to the shale gas boom, in the
energy input mix.
Experience with ISO/RTO is the cumulative number of years that a state (or a
part of it) has been active in a Regional Transmission Organization/Independent
System Operator. These institutions facilitate the transmission of electri-
city between states. Computed from Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(2017), this variable is a proxy for the quality of a state’s electricity grid and
how easy it is to switch from one source of electricity production to another.
Due to the intermittency, more experience in such an organization is expected
to lead to more investments.5
3. Socioeconomic factors
The first two socioeconomic factors, population and GDP per capita, are obtai-
ned from U.S. Census Bureau (2017) and U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis
(2017), respectively. Population is the number of inhabitants (in million) and
GDP per capita is the nominal GDP per capita (in thousand $). Both coeffi-
cients are expected to be positive. The first because it is a proxy for the total
demand for renewable energy, and the second because emission reductions are
a normal good.6
The other two socioeconomic variables are proxies for the tastes of residents.
Democrat governor is a dummy variable, which takes the value 1 when the
5The quality of our results is independent from the way we measure the role of the ISO/RTO
(using a dummy variable or including a square term instead).
6Of course these are also proxies for the overall energy demand.
9state governor is a Democrat. LofCV indicator is an index based on the
scorecard produced by League of Conservative Voters (2017), which lists the
“greenness” of state representatives’ at the federal congress on environmental
issues using voting data. It is a categorical/ordinal variable between 0 and 4,
where the most environmental friendly states are awarded a 4 and the least
environmentally friendly are awarded a 0. Both these variables are expected
to have a positive sign.
4. Policy and tax factors
As it is not the core focus of our paper, we use two aggregate variables ba-
sed on DSIRE (2017). Policy is the number of regulatory and policy tools
(among public benefit funds, renewable portfolio standard, net metering sy-
stem, interconnected standard, required green power option and feed-in tariff)
in place to promote renewable in each year for each state. Tax is the number
of financial incentives available (from personal, corporate, sales and property
tax measures). We expect that these two categorical variables have a positive
sign. Note that our results remain unchanged if we use a less parsimonious
approach where separate dummies for each policies separately.
The summary statistics of our variables can be found in Table 3 and 4 of the
Appendix.
2.2 Methodology
From our 877 observations, 494 observations have an investment equal to zero, i.e.
there were no capacity investment during these years/states.7
Linear panel data models result in biased and inconsistent estimates, as they are
not able to account for the difference between corner and strictly positive observati-
ons. To accommodate for these non-negative dependent variables, we use a censored
Tobit model for panel data with random effects. Hence, our zeros are seen as actual
outcomes and are generated by the same mechanisms as our positive outcomes. It
was used previously by Delmas and Montes-Santo (2011), Hitaj (2013) or Rodriguez
et al. (2015) in the literature on the determinants of renewable investments. Other
approaches to treat these zeros are derived and discussed later on in the paper.
7From our original sample, we exclude five observations that are missing the price of natural
gas or recent data on nuclear energy production. Despite this, we analyze our data as a balanced
panel.
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Let the vector Xit represent all our explanatory variables, including the natural
gas price variables, in a state i = 1, ..., N in time t = 1, ..., T . We can define the
latent, unobservable, renewable capacity investment y∗it as:
y∗it = αi +Xitβ + it
where the error terms it are i.i.d. N (0, σ2e) and the random effects αi are i.i.d
N (0, σ2a). We estimate a censored panel Tobit model where this latent variable






0 if y∗it ≤ 0
Due to the incidental parameter problem raised by Neyman and Scott (1948), we
control for unobserved heterogeneity using a random heterogeneity-specific compo-
nent for each state, instead of the fixed effects model. This assumption implies that
state-specific effects are uncorrelated with our independent variables. The problem
of endogeneity will be further discussed in our robustness analysis.
Due to the absence of closed-form solutions, the log likelihood is computed using a
numerical approximation (Gaussian quadrature). Following a change in the number
of quadrature points, estimates tend to be unchanged. This can be explained by
our sample size and large within-group observations. Hence, our results seem to be
reliable. In order to estimate the variance-covariance matrix of our estimator, we
apply the bootstrap procedure for the standard errors with 200 repetitions. Further
robustness checks are derived at the end of this section.
2.3 Main results
Our main empirical results are provided in Table 1. Each of the three regressions
looks at the determinants of renewable capacity investments. The first column
displays our base model without year fixed-effects. The linear and quadratic term
related with natural gas price are significant respectively at the 1% and 5% threshold.
The first is positive and the second is negative. This supports our suggestive evidence
that the relationship between natural gas price and renewable capacity investments
is non-linear. Precisely, we have an inverted U-shaped relationship between the two
variables. This means that for relatively low prices, a marginal increase in price
tends to increase investments in renewable energy. Above this price threshold, the
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reverse holds and they are complements, as a marginal increase in prices tends to
decrease investments in renewables.
In regression (1), the coefficient estimates for the electricity market factors are
in line with what we have discussed in the previous subsection. Wind potential and
sun potential are both positive, but only the former is significant. Larger states host
more investments but this is not significant. States facing an increasing demand for
electricity tend to invest less in renewable energies. One explanation can be that
investments in technologies with more flexibility are preferred as they are a safer
way to secure the supply of the electricity demanded. An increase in electricity price
means a higher return for each capacity unit invested. This coefficient is positive
and significant. Previous investments in renewable energies call for more invest-
ments but this coefficient is not significant. On the contrary, when nuclear energies
have a prominent place in the production of electricity, less investments are taking
place. This relationship is significant and is due to the lack of flexibility of nuclear
energies. Depending more on natural gas has a positive but not significant impact
on investments. Having experience with ISO/RTO helps improving the quality of
the grid, and subsequently the switch from one source of energy to another, this has
a positive and significant impact on investments. For the socioeconomic covariates,
we observe that a higher GDP per capita leads to more investments but this is not
significant. Population, Democrat governor and LofCV indicator have all an impact
on our dependent variable which is not significant. Policy and tax factors are both
positive and significant.
Regression (2) includes in addition years effects. By using a dummy for each
years, we are able to capture unobserved time-invariant effects. This can reduce
potential concerns about time-varying macroeconomic effects which have an impact
on investments and are not included in our model. For example, it can capture the
influence of the U.S. shale gas boom on renewables and some of the effects created
by technological changes in the sector. Due to this reason, this is our preferred
regression. This is confirmed by the likelihood ratio test. By considering these
year effects, we have that our main results hold. Natural gas price and natural
gas price (squared) are respectively positive and negative at the 5% level. With
their respective values, the maximum of the inverted U-curve is at around 5.87$ per
million Btu, while the mean value is 5.186$.8 Note that this also impacts the size of
some of our coefficients. This is due to the within variance of the variables which is
now captured by these time dummies.
8Remark that this is very close to the maximum of the quadratic fit of our data pictured in
Figure 1 which does not consider any control variables.
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Table 1
Renewable capacity investments as a continuous variable : Panel data Tobit model
(1) (2) (3)
Natural gas price 2.099*** 2.302** -0.137
(0.611) (0.098) (0.255)
Natural gas price (squared) -0.174** -0.196**
(0.049) (0.076)
Wind potential 0.112* 0.117** 0.122**
(0.06) (0.059) (0.061)
Sun potential 1.024 -0.322 -293
(2.09) (1.943) (1.99)
State size 0.004 0.004 0.003
(0.017) (0.015) (0.015)
Growth in electricity sales -16.9*** -4.38 -2.624
(6.01) (7.48) (7.297)
Electricity price 0.219 -0.137 -0.125
(0.314) (0.326) (0.325)
Production % renew. Energy -15.226** -21.397** -21.931**
(7.5) (8.85) (8.94)
Production % nuclear energy -15.23 -21.4 -21.931
(7.502) (8.851) (8.939)
Production % natural gas 4.618 1.69 1.86
(4.954) (4.255) (4.479)
Experience with ISO/RTO 0.353*** 0.202 0.187
(0.114) (0.127) (0.129)
GDP per capita 0.034 -0.044 -0.034
(0.046) (0.059) (0.059)
Population 0.182 0.231 0.228
(0.217) (0.164) (0.167)
Democrat governor -0.246 -0.17 -0.185
(0.701) (0.673) (0.682)
LofCV indicator 0.531 0.79* 0.782*
(0.37) (0.405) (0.408)
Policy 1.02*** 0.271 0.268
(0.332) (0.324) (0.31)
Tax 1.193*** 0.451 0.407
(0.422) (0.419 ) (0.427)
Constant -22.456*** -13.803* -9.038
(8.067) (8.396) (8.213)
Year fixed effects No Yes Yes
Log likelihood -1374.88 -1327.1411 -1332.205
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Sample: 877 observations - 49 states - period 1998-2015 (including 494 left-censored observations)
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Compared with specification (2), specification (3) only allows a linear relationship
between natural gas price and additional renewable capacity. This linear term has
a negative sign, though close to zero, meaning that an increase in price leads to
less investments. However, this is not significant, i.e. we cannot claim that these
two sources of energy are complementary. Hence, our data is better estimated using
both a linear and a quadratic term.9
Overall our results all go in the same direction. While, for relatively low natu-
ral gas price, renewable energy and natural gas are substitutable inputs, they are
complementary for high natural gas prices.
2.4 Robustness analysis
We examine the robustness of our results using alternative specifications, the re-
gressions of which are shown in Table 2. Regression (2) is our benchmark case. We
use different dependent and independent variables as well as alternative estimation
procedures. Finally we discuss the issue of endogeneity. Our robustness analysis
confirms, and further strengthens, our main results. Note however that, due to the
various approaches used, it is complicated to compare directly the parameter estima-
tes of our control variables, although they tend to be similar across specifications.10
Eventual changes can be explained by the use of state/year fixed effects, of other
estimators or of other dependent variables. Hence, in this analysis, we will focus on
our main variables of concern.
First, in our main results, we consider a random component for each state, to
account for state-specific conditions potentially impacting the dependent variable.
With Tobit panel data, it is not possible to consider conditional fixed effects be-
cause there are no statistic that allow the fixed effects to be conditioned out of the
likelihood (Stata (2009)). However, it is possible to compute unconditional state
fixed effects, although these estimates are biased and inconsistent. In addition time-
invariant variables drop out. Results are shown in regression (4). We see that this
does not influence our parameter estimates and that both are significant at the 1%
level.
In regression (5) and (6), we examine the robustness of our results with respect
9Adding a further cubic and quartic term does not impact this conclusion. Results are available
upon request.
10Remark that the price threshold, defined as the maximum of the quadratic relationship between




Dependent variable (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Renewable Energy Capacity Capacity Product. Capacity Capacity Capacity Cap. Tob.
Tobit Probit Tobit Tobit FE Spline Wind
Natural gas price 2.13*** 0.57** 2.28** 1.28*** 2.29**
(0.78) (0.24) (1.02) (0.47) (1.14)
Natural gas price (squared) -0.18*** -0.05*** -0.17** -0.12*** -0.19**
(0.06) (0.02) (0.08) (0.04) (0.09)
Average petroleum price 0.16**
(0.08)
Natural gas price spline 1 0.46**
(0.22)
Natural gas price spline 2 -1.34***
(0.48)
Wind potential 0.02*** 0.18* 0.12** 0.11* 0.12**
(0.004) (0.11) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
Sun potential 0.23** 0.66 -0.42 1.06 -1.34
(0.12) (3.65) (1.94) (2.12) (1.93)
State size 0.001*** 0.006 0.003 0.004 0.005
(0.00) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Growth in electricity sales -2.23 -1.46 -13.45 -2.1 -1.02 -17.01*** -6.81
(6.87) (1.86) (8.82) (7.35) (3.58) (5.96) 8.76
Electricity price 0.16 -0.11*** 0.84** -0.11 -0.15 0.25 -0.05
(0.27) (0.04) (0.4) (0.33) (0.2) (0.31) 0.37
Production % renew. energy -21.11*** 0.91 -9.46 -24.22*** 3.72 -15.34** -3.61
(6.47) (1.71) (12.93) (9.13) (5.82) (7.51) (9.38)
Production % nuclear energy 0.35 -1.11*** -1.05 -7.2 4.02 -7.08 -12.36**
(8.77) (0.42) (10.06) (4.65) (5.78) (5.74) (5.38)
Production % natural gas 10.39*** -0.86** 9.75 1.2 0.84 4.91 -8.31**
(3.63) (0.37) (7.9) (4.29) (2.64) (5.02) (3.93)
Experience with ISO/RTO 0.2** 0.02 0.44** 0.22* 0.16* 0.35*** 0.34
(0.09) (0.02) (0.2) (0.13) (0.08) (0.11) (0.15)
GDP per capita -0.08 0.02** 0.01 -0.04 -0.01 0.04 0.03
(0.05) (0.01) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07)
Population 0.21 0.06*** 0.05 0.28* 0.85** 0.18 0.21
(0.38) (0.01) (0.42) (0.16) (0.36) (0.22) (0.16)
Democrat governor -0.25 -0.02 1.5 -0.18 -0.09 -0.25 0.13
(0.45) (0.11) (1.05) (0.71) (0.37) (0.71) (0.77)
LofCV indicator 0.66** 0.37*** 0.71 0.71 0.3 0.51 0.54
(0.32) (0.07) (0.64) (0.4) (0.23) (0.37) (0.39)
Policy 0.08 0.1** 0.91 0.29 0.31 1.04*** 0.33
(0.25) (0.05) (0.59) (0.31) (0.21) (0.33) (0.34)
Tax 0.25 0.1** 1.29 0.41 0.31 1.13*** 0.75
(0.34) (0.05) (0.72) (0.42) (0.27) (0.43) (0.35)
Constant -24.57 -4.59 -28.59 -9.39 -8.61** -19.61** -10.91
(2267.38) (0.87) (14.43) (7.81) (3.41) (8.23) (8.71)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes
State fixed effects Yes No No No Yes No No
Log likelihood -1231.07 -279.57 -1680.13 -980.63 / -1376.81 -1139.42
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Sample: 877 observations - 49 states - period 1998-2015
(4), (7) and(9) Renewable capacity investment as a dependent variable (494 left-censored observations)
(5) Renewable capacity investment dummy as a dependent variable
(6) Renewable energy production (433 left-censored observations)
(8) Renewable capacity investment (log(a+ y) with a = 0.3 as a dependent variable and heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.
(10) Wind capacity investment (566 left-censored observations)
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to different dependent variables. First, using the same data, we redefine renewable
capacity investment as a dummy variable, where 1 denotes that an investment was
made. Due to this change, we use a different estimation strategy: a panel Probit
model with random effects. We see from regression (5), where marginal effects at the
means are computed, that the estimates for the linear and squared terms of price of
natural gas have the expected signs and are both significant. Even though the levels
of the estimates differ from the ones before, they tend to give a maximum of the
inverted U-relationship at a similar price level. Next, in regression (6), we look at
the determinants of changes in electricity production from renewable sources instead
of renewable capacity investments, also using data from U.S. Energy Information
Administration (2017). Again, we find similar results as before. Note however that
standard errors are negatively impacted whenever we consider year fixed effects in
the regression, as conjectural factors are more important when we consider pro-
duction rather than investment as a dependent variable because renewable energy
has a low variable cost.
In regression (7), we use the average petroleum price (EIA (2016)) instead of the
price of natural gas. Looking at cases with both a linear and a quadratic term and
with only a linear term, we find that the specification with the best fit and the most
significant result is the one with a lag of one year and only a linear term. We see
that an increase in the average petroleum price leads to an increase in investments.
This means that renewable and petroleum energy sources are substitutes. Follo-
wingLee et al. (2012), this can be explained by the lack of flexibility of petroleum
in circumventing the intermittency problem created by renewable energy sources.
In regression (8), we treat differently the problem created by the high number of
zero observations by performing a least square dummy variable regression. Before
this, we have added a constant (a = 0.3) before taking the log of all our dependent
variables. It is independent from the constant chosen, although if the constant is
too large it decreases within sample variation. Again, in this case, time-invariant
variables drop out and our main findings remain valid. Further, we have also ex-
cluded from our sample states without any positive observation for our dependent
variables. Our main results hold.11 Hence our conclusions are both observed from
inter- and/or intra-regional variations in our observations.
In regression (9), we use a semi-parametric model using a spline approach. We
split the natural gas price range into different intervals, at knots, and make a linear
regression between these knots. Assuming different numbers of knots, we retain the
11Results are available upon request.
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specification with two intervals, as suggested by Akaike Information criterion. On
the one hand, we find that, for the 50% smallest price observations, the best linear
approximation has a positive sign. On the other hand, we find that, for the 50%
largest price observations, the best linear approximation has a negative sign. Both
are significant at the 10% and 1% thresholds. Applying this piecewise linear model
confirms that the relationship between our two variables of concern is non-linear.
In regression (10), we focus only on renewable investments in the wind sector.
We obtain similar results with a positive sign for the linear term and a negative
sign for the quadratic term. They are both significant in the case of investments in
wind energy while they are not significant for investments in solar energy, with and
without a quadratic term.12 The main reason for this difference is that the develop-
ment of solar energy is quite limited in our sample, around 4% of all investments in
renewable capacities. In addition, only 149 of our 877 observations have a strictly
positive value. Another potential interpretation is related to the characteristics of
these primary energy sources. Wind tends to blow at night, during off-peak hours,
while sun shines during daytime at peak hours. In some sense this is related to ca-
pacity constraint which is more likely to be binding during the day for solar energy
than for wind energy. As a result solar energy has a higher shadow cost than wind.
One final important issue to discuss is endogeneity. There are several factors
that can explain why endogeneity does not undermine our main results. First, the
scope for reverse causality is limited by the fact that we look at marginal rather than
accumulated investments in renewable capacities. The impact on the natural gas
price is much more limited due to the relatively small level of annual investments
compared with accumulated investments. In addition, in our sample, on average,
only one percent of the electricity production comes from renewable sources. Second,
our main specification considers a one-year lag between the price of natural gas and
renewable capacity investments. It is unlikely that prices in the gas market are
impacted by investments that will produce electricity in a year, especially considering
the important cost of natural gas storage. Finally, the fact that we look at long-
run investment behavior (in opposition to short-run dispatch behavior) and that
we use yearly data undermines the scope for reverse causality. However, there is
the possibility of an omitted variable bias created by a third variable not included
in our model, which influences both the natural gas price and renewable capacity
investments. In our context, this could be due to unobserved policies (such as a
decision to phase out nuclear power) or demand/supply shocks (such as a technical
12Results available upon request.
17
problem that makes it impossible to use a dam or a nuclear power plant). Note
however that many of these unobserved factors are captured by our year/state fixed
effects.
3 A theoretical explanation
This section provides a model developed to shed some light on our empirical fin-
dings (see Tables 1 & 2) that investment in renewables and natural gas electricity
generation are positively related for a high variable cost of natural gas. In this
model, we aim to reconcile the two contrasting views of the relationship between
natural gas and renewable energy sources that can be rival as well as complementary
technologies.
We model the basic tradeoff a state-level representative energy company (he-
reafter referred as the firm) faces when it plans to invest in renewable capacities,
knowing that natural gas can be used to supply the market in instances of excess
demand, such as during peak periods or a production failure. One may think that
our stylized energy firm is an investor-owned utility or a fully private firm that aims
to optimize its energy portfolio by considering investment in renewable capacities.
The underlying trade-off can be seen through the contrasting effects the natural
gas price may produce on the investment of capacity in renewable. To that purpose,
we say that natural gas and renewable energy are substitutable energy sources when
the natural gas price positively affects capacity in renewable energy. In contrast, they
are considered as complementary when an increase in the natural gas price reduces
capacity in renewables. Similar types of trade-offs have already been analyzed in
more general microeconomic settings incorporating uncertainty with respect to input
prices or investment factors (see for instance Blair (1974) and Abel and Eberly
(1994)).
The main features of our framework are twofold: First, uncertainty affects the
maximal level of output achievable using a given technology (in this case, renewable
power production). Second, at the margin, the more secure and flexible source of
supply (here, natural gas) is always more expensive than the risky or unsecured
technology (here, the renewable one).
Let k ≥ 0 be the renewable capacity investment in electricity from the intermit-
tent sources (in terms of capital cost).13 We assume that this investment is norma-
13We assume that (a very large amount of) gas turbines have been already installed and that
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lized to represent an additional capacity that generates f(k) kWh, where f(k) is a
twice differentiable, positive, increasing and concave (but not necessarily strictly)
production function, so that f(0) = 0. We denote φ = f−1 such that φ(y) depicts
the necessary renewable capacity to generate y kWh. This assumption implies that
investment opportunities exhibit non-increasing returns in terms of generation. We
denote the intermittency factor by x ∈ [0, 1], such that Prob(x = ξ) = pi (ξ) where
pi (x) is a continuous density function. In case of windy or sunny weather, i.e favora-
ble conditions, the intermittency factor is close to one but it can be zero for cloudy,
gloomy or lull weather conditions. The function pi (x) describes the expected weat-
her conditions based on meteorological inference. Therefore, the available electricity
from renewable source is xf(k).
The natural gas price (i.e. on spot markets) is assumed to be certain, or equal to
its common knowledge expected value14, and is denoted by w, while q(x) denotes the
short-term supply of power from natural gas-fired power plants (which is adjustable).
At the time of delivery, the energy demanded (which is, for simplicity, deterministic
and exogenous) is given by Q > 0, and the market or social value of this electricity
delivered is assumed to be given by V (Q) = v.
For a representative state-level firm15, the problem is to choose q (x) ex-post and k
ex-ante such that its expected valuation of the operating profit from the intermittent
activity for the firm, denoted Π =
∫ 1
0
pi(x)U (v − wq (x)− k) dx is maximized, where
U is a twice differentiable function, strictly increasing and strictly concave.16
Due to intermittency, the renewable source of energy is not always available, then
the short-term supply of natural gas q(x) is necessarily not lower than Q − xf(k),
these costs are sunk. This assumption allows us to better disentangle the problems arising from
the emergence of intermittent renewable energy sources.
14It might be argued that the short run risk associated with weather conditions may be over-
whelmed by the long term risk associated with the natural gas price. We do not ignore that a
trend of the literature suggests a relationship between the uncertainty in natural gas prices and
the return to renewable investments, mainly for hedging purposes (e.g. Berry (2005), Bolinger
et al. (2006) or Graves and Litvinova (2009)). However in order to concentrate on the effects of
natural gas price anticipated levels and to avoid an increasing level of complexity in the model, we
voluntarily do not consider volatility as an explanatory factor for renewable investments.
15Other interpretations are also possible. For instance it might be that the firm is a fringe
competitor that has committed to deliver Q units. The fringe competitor is non-strategic, takes
the natural gas price as given, considers investing in intermittently available capacity. Then the
natural gas price could then be interpreted as the spot price if intermittent energy sources are not
available. However considering strategic markets with multiple firms, such as some that specialize
entirely in renewable power, while others have only fossil-fueled power plants have been studied
by Bouckaert and De Borger (2014) and do not support complementarities.
16This utility function represents the difference of evaluation in profit for all states of nature.
For instance it can mimic the increasing cost of a black-out that could arises in case of an energy
shortage.
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whenever it is nonnegative. Considering that the natural gas has a higher supply
cost in each state of nature x and considering the covered market condition, the
supply of natural gas obeys to q (x) = max{0, Q−xf(k)}. Thus, the firm’s problem





pi(x)U (v − wmax{0, Q− xf(k)} − k) dx.
Now our aim is to understand the features of the solution of this problem and
to study how the optimal renewable capacity investment k varies with respect to
the natural gas price w. We focus on the case where the renewable capacity is less
than the realized demand, that is when demand is sufficiently high, namely when




pi(x) (wxf ′(k∗)− 1)U ′ (Ax) dx = 0
where Ax = v −wQ+wxf(k∗)− k∗. Denoting that E (U ′) =
∫ 1
0
pi(x)U ′ (Ax) dx > 0
and E (xU ′) =
∫ 1
0
xpi(x)U ′ (Ax) dx, one can rewrite (1) in a more interpretable way
(2) wf ′(k∗)E (xU ′) = E (U ′)
This condition has the following interpretation. Whenever it is optimal for the firm
to invest in additional renewable capacities, it balances the expected marginal utility
of the opportunity net reward for not having to buy costly natural gas on the spot
market (i.e. wf ′(k∗)E (xU ′)) and the expected marginal utility of one monetary unit
spent in capacity (i.e. E (U ′)). Hence whenever it is strictly positive18, k∗ solves the
equation f ′(k∗) = E (U ′) /(wE (xU ′)).
At this stage, our main objective is to assess when k∗ is an increasing or a
decreasing function of w. In other words, can renewable intermittent energy and
natural gas be substitutable or complementary input factors? In the following, we
argue that this is intrinsically related to the intermittent nature of renewable energy
and the partial supply risk it creates.
17When the renewable capacity investment is sufficient to cover the realized demand, the optimal
investment will be k∗ = φ(Q), and all the energy demand is served through the costless renewable
capacity. This is the situation that may arise for solar energy sources that are more likely to meet
the demand during the day then wind sources. This is consistent with the empirical result we find
in page 16.
18As a result k∗ = 0 is optimal if w < w = 1/[f ′(0)E (x)].
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Result. Renewable energy and natural gas are complements if the following neces-











If it is not, they are substitutes.
The Result illustrates that depending on the strength of aversion to intermit-
tency, the degree of intermittency and the level of natural gas price, renewable
capacity investments can be decreasing as the natural gas price is increasing. This
occurs when the marginal cost related to a lack of wind or sunlight increases faster
than the marginal benefit of having access to a free input.
We can further interpret the inequality condition in Eq. (3). The left-side of the
inequality can be viewed as the degree of flexibility the energy firm faces. Indeed it
is the marginal rate of decrease in renewable production due to the investment k
when the natural gas price rises (f ′(k)/f(k)). Hence when the solar or wind capacity
investment diminishes, the left hand side of Eq. (3) describes the ability with which
the firm can balance profit losses in case of sunshine or wind by gains in the contrary
case. The right-side of the inequality can be viewed as the degree of intermittency
aversion the firm exhibits. Indeed it represents the variation with respect to the
natural gas price of the expected marginal rate of substitution between profits in
all states of nature (i.e. E (xU ′) /E (U ′)). That is, the rise in profits needed to
compensate the monetary loss due to a lower renewable capacity investment when
sun shines or wind blows.
One can now argue that whenever the degree of flexibility is weaker than the
degree of intermittency aversion, the energy producer will have an incentive to lower
renewable capacity investments when natural gas input prices rise. In that case,
renewable and fossil energy sources can be viewed as complementary.
The condition represented in Eq. (3) of our Result may be easily seen not to
hold when intermittency is not an issue.19. In this context, the firm faces a trade-off
between the monetary cost of investing in new renewable capacities and the benefit
obtained with certainty from not having to purchase this energy from the gas spot
market. This opportunity return is becoming more important when the natural gas
price increases, so is the marginal investment in renewables. Indeed, when there is no
19For example, there could be technological advances that make it possible to store wind or solar
energy of the electricity it produces. Indeed in this case pi (x) becomes a degenerated distribution
such that pi (1) = 1 and pi (x) = 0 for x 6= 1.
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more uncertainty about the state of nature in the short-term, the expected marginal
rate of substitution between profits vanishes to 1 and necessarily an increase in the
natural gas price will not change it, the degree of intermittency aversion equals zero.
Energy factors are then substitutes as in the standard version of the firm’s choice of
inputs.
Moreover this substitutability setup also arises in two others contexts. First, it
holds when the firm exhibits a constant substitution between profits in all states of
nature, that is it has a purely monetary-based decision criteria as E (xU ′) = E (x).
Second, energy factors are also substitutes when the natural gas price is very low.
Indeed, we have seen above that if w < w = 1/[f ′(0)E (x)] then k∗ = 0. As a
result, for values of the natural gas price in the right neighborhood the threshold w,
we have f ′(k∗)/f(k∗) → ∞ and condition (3) does not hold. On the contrary, the
complementarity condition (3) holds possibly when intermittency impacts strongly
the generation activity, when the firm holder evaluates differently profits earned in
different states of nature and when natural gas prices are high.
In our general framework, it is not possible to provide conditions about this price
threshold without considering a given class of the function U . We give one example
for which the inequality given in our Result holds. Let us consider a constant relative
risk aversion utility function, with U (z) = zθ where θ ∈ [0, 1] is the relative risk
aversion parameter and the linear production function is f (k) = ak, where a > 0.
Moreover we assume a uniform distribution for x, i.e. equiprobable intermittency,












(wa− 2) (v − wQ)
3 + (wa− 3)wa .




∆ = (va)2 − 3avQ + 3Q2. Hence, kˆ(w) is increasing if w < w¯ and is decreasing
otherwise, as depicted in Figure 2.
In this example, the two energy sources can be seen as substitutes when the
natural gas price is sufficiently low, and complements otherwise. This result is
reminiscent of the ones we had in the previous empirical section and notably when







Renewable capacity investment (k) as a function of the price of natural gas (w)
The black line denotes capacity. The red line denotes the electricity demand.
4 Conclusion and policy implications
This paper provides new insights into the relationship between renewable methods
of producing electricity (focusing on wind and solar power), and dispatchable non-
renewable methods. We study the degree of substitutability and complementarity
between these two sources of energy. This relationship is not linear. Using aggregate
investment data, we find that, for relatively high prices only, an increase in the price
of natural gas can lead to a decrease in renewable investments. The reverse holds for
relatively low prices. Our theoretical explanation unveils a potential story behind
this non-monotonic relationship. It highlights the trade-off between the relative
degree of flexibility of renewable energy with respect to natural gas and the degree of
intermittency aversion a representative state company exhibits when the renewable
energy source must be replaced in the blink of an eye when there are shortfalls. We
argue that this second force increases proportionally with the price of natural gas,
giving scope for complementarities.
Our results suggest that a comprehensive approach to energy supply is more ap-
propriate. Investments in renewable and non-renewable energy should be considered
in tandem due to the interrelationship between these two electricity sources. It is
essential that the renewable energy sector does not ignore the natural gas market.
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Direct policies (such as taxes or subsidies) or indirect policies that affect the natural
gas market can impact the renewable energy sector significantly. New free trade
agreements or tense political relationships with major natural gas exporting coun-
tries, as well as policies towards natural gas exploration and exploitation can have
an effect on investments in the renewable sector.
Some issues remain open. A first methodological issue is the high quantity of zero
observations in our dependent variable. Another, complementary, estimation stra-
tegy would be to consider it with a self-selection approach a la Heckman. However,
it is unclear which variable plays a role in the selection step and not in the intensity
step.20 Another related question concerns how the relationship between natural gas
and renewable energy will evolve. What will be the impact of technological advances
in the electricity grid impact? How will the ability to store electricity of renewable
energy sources influence this? We leave these questions for future investigations.
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Variable Units Mean Standard Deviation Min Max
Renewable capacity investment Megawatts 3.329 4.24 0 14.962
(inverse hyperbolic sine transf.)
Natural gas price USD/MBtu 5.186 2.027 1.48 11.81
Wind potential∗ TWh/year 11.915 22.133 0 94.918
Sun potential∗ kWh/m2 /day 4.222 0.558 2.4 5.7
State size∗ Km2 200.031 250.912 4.002 1717.854
Growth in electricity sales % 0.011 0.034 −0.215 0.187
Electricity price cents/Kwh 8.547 2.815 3.89 18.06
Production % renew. energy % 0.019 0.042 0 0.315
Production % nuclear energy % 0.177 0.182 0 0.808
Production % natural gas % 0.203 0.221 0 0.989
Experience with ISO/RTO Years 3.795 5.405 0 17
GDP per capita K USD 43.283 11.229 21.788 87.523
Population Millions 6.096 6.628 0.491 38.994
Democrat governor Dummy 0.431 0.495 0 1
LofCV indicator Index variable 1.748 1.329 0 4
Policy Number of 2.053 1.708 0 6
Tax Number of 1.351 1.238 0 4
Variables marked with (∗) are time invariant
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Table 4
Summary statistics (2): Correlation matrix
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17)
(1) Renewable capacity investment 1.000
(2) Natural gas price 0.118 1.000
(3) Wind potential 0.312 −0.038 1.000
(4) Sun potential 0.05 0.031 0.182 1.000
(5) State size 0.141 −0.159 0.238 −0.241 1.000
(6) Growth in electricity sales −0.106 −0.279 0.071 0.083 0.045 1.000
(7) Electricity price 0.189 0.224 −0.19 −0.225 0.101 −0.222 1.000
(8) Production % renew. Energy 0.48 0.014 0.307 0.015 0.069 −0.026 0.055 1.000
(9) Production % nuclear energy −0.127 0.062 −0.197 −0.072 −0.289 −0.064 0.297 −0.224 1.000
(10) Production % natural gas 0.079 −0.003 −0.086 0.071 0.227 −0.07 0.541 −0.08 −0.186 1.000
(11) Experience with ISO/RTO 0.411 0.243 0.086 −0.217 −0.138 −0.172 0.521 0.378 0.084 0.096 1.000
(12) GDP per capita 0.389 0.234 −0.023 −0.268 0.202 −0.108 0.605 0.356 0.01 0.274 0.482 1.000
(13) Population 0.301 0.026 0.035 0.13 0.101 −0.041 0.228 −0.02 0.158 0.218 0.148 0.122 1.000
(14) Democrat governor 0.044 0.131 −0.094 −0.151 −0.125 −0.056 0.044 0.041 0.05 −0.12 0.65 0.106 −0.019 1.000
(15) LofCV indicator 0.076 0.2 −0.317 −0.244 −0.324 −0.114 0.48 −0.104 0.251 0.226 0.289 0.204 0.118 0.207 1.000
(16) Policy 0.433 0.217 −0.078 −0.185 −0.135 −0.185 0.531 0.287 0.125 0.179 0.607 0.553 0.161 0.213 0.448 1.000
(17) Tax 0.377 0.143 0.121 0.136 −0.061 −0.075 0.347 0.232 0.093 0.125 0.328 0.306 0.146 0.026 0.165 0.378 1.000
Proof of Result. Using standard results from the comparative statics theory (see
for instance Amir (2005)), we know that k∗(w) will be increasing (or respectively
decreasing) on a given domain, if the expected profit Π exhibits an increasing diffe-
rences (respectively decreasing differences) with respect to (k, w) in that domain. As




and decreasing differences occurs when ∂
2Π
∂k∂w






U ′ (Ax)pi(x) [xf ′(k) + (wxf ′(k)− 1) (Q− xf(k)) r (Ax)] dx
Defining r (Π) = −U ′′ (Π) /U ′ (Π) > 0, the Arrow-Pratt measure of aversion to
intermittency, one can rewrite as:
∂2Π
∂k∂w
= f ′(k) {E (xU ′) + f(k)wB} − f(k)C




















U ′ (Ax) r (Ax) dx > 0.
Hence one can see that ∂
2Π
∂k∂w
≤ 0 if f ′(k)
f(k)
E (xU ′) + f ′(k)wB ≤ C. Then Π exhibits










Rigourously, concavity of Π in k is needed at this stage, to allow the substitution of
the first order condition (2). Fortunately, this is the case due to the concavity of U
and f .
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If this condition is true, the Π exhibits decreasing differences (evaluated at the
interior optimum) so k∗(w) is increasing in w. If the reserve condition is true then
k∗(w) is decreasing.
